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Abstract 
This paper examines the effect of introducing insider tratlin~; restrictions on the 
behaviour of the Amsterdam Stock Exchange. From 198'7 on, insiders are no longer allowed 
to trade two months before an annual earnings announcement. The results indicate that 
stocks became less liquid (when liquidity is measured by trading volume) when insiders 
were not allowed to trade. We also find some evidence that the introduction of insider 
trading restrictions reduced the stock market's peed of adjustment to positive earnings 
news. 
JEL classification: G 14 
Keyword.s': Insider trading: Regulation: Liquidity 
1. Introduction 
On January 1, 1987, the Amsterdam Stock Exchange (ASE) adopted a Mode l  
Code,  which specified that insiders were no longer allGwed to trade in the 
company's  tock during the two months preceding the announcement of annual 
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earnings. ~ This study tests whether the introduction of this regulation had any 
material impact on tile behaviour of stock prices and liquidity on the ASE. 
Specifically, this paper tests for the 'conventional wisdom' about insider trading, 
i.e., that it reduces outside investors' confidence and that it makes markets more 
informationaily efficient. 
Kyle (1985) develops a model that formalises this 'conventional' intuition. In 
his model a monopolistic insider who has unique access to private information 
about the underlying asset rades against uninformed liquidity traders and against 
market makers who set prices on the basis of the aggregate order flow. The ii~sider 
trades in such a way that his private information is incorporated gradually into 
prices, so that markets become more informationally efficient (see also Manne, 
1966). Kyle's model also captures Bagehot (1971) intuition that market makers 
compensate themselves for bad trades due to adverse selection of insiders by 
making the market less liquid (see also Amihud and Mendelsohn, 1986; Copeland 
and Galai, 1983; Giosten and Milgrom, 1985). 
The main problem with the traditional hypothesis i that it only considers three 
types of traders: a monopolistic nsider, liquidity traders and market makers. When 
many insiders (not just a monopolist) are participating in a market insider trading 
may actually increase liquidity (Grossman, 1986; Holden and Subrahmanyam, 
1992). Moreover, some noise traders (Black, 1986; Delong et al., 1990) may be 
attracted by insiders, so that the elimination of insider trading activity may actually 
reduce liquidity (Cornell and Sirri, 1992). Finally, insider trading restrictions may 
increase incentives for other information traders (financial analysts, etc.) to collect 
costly information, so that insider trading restrictions may make markets more 
efficient, not less (Fishman and Hagerty, 1992). 
In short, the predictions of the theoretical literature depend on the assumptions 
made about he relative importance of insiders, other information traders (financial 
analysts), liquidity traders and noise traders. Hence, the effect of insider trading 
activity on stock prices and trading volume is ultimately an empirical issue. The 
introduction of insider trading restrictions in the Netherlands provides an interest- 
ing controlled experimental setting to perform such a test. 
To our knowledge, only one other paper (Cornell and Sirrl, 1992), employing 
Insiders (as defined by the law) are no longer allowed to trade in the company's stock and stock 
options during the two months preceding the announcement of annual earnings reports. According to 
the law, insiders are not unly top company officials but also any person 'connected' with the company 
who can have access to private information, such as employees, stock exchange members and financial 
journalists with access to the exchange floor. Insider monitoring and peualties occur on two levels. 
First. every company has a compliance officer in charge of mculitoring insider t ansactions and warning 
eloployees that a 'forbidden trading period' has started (Baron van lttersutn. 1989). Hence, insider 
trading can be considered asa breach of employment contract or fiduciary duties. Besides monitoring 
by the company, a Stock Watch committee looks for abnonnal movements in prices and trading 
volume. 
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data on insider trading around the Anheuser-Bush tender offer for Campbell 
Taggart, has empirically examined the effect of insider trading on market liquidity. 
The authors reject the first part of the 'conventional hypothesis' i.e., the proposi- 
tion that insider trading reduces liquidity, and argue that insiders attract noise 
traders. They (and also Meulbrock, 1992) report evidence consistent with the 
second part of the 'conventional hypothesis': through their activity, insiders 
incorporate a large fraction of the information into share prices before the 
information is made public. Jarrell and Poulson (1989), however, argue that the 
price run-up in takeover bids has little to do with insider activity. 
2. Data 
All 136 Dutch stocks that were continuously listed on the Amsterdam Stock 
Exchange from January 1984 until June 1989 were considered. The daily stock 
prices were obtained from Datastream Inc. and adjusted for dividends and other 
distributions. The choice of 1984 as the start of our sample period was determined 
by data requirements: complete information on prices and volume on more than 
110 Dutch companies was only available after 1983. In order to reduce the 
likelihood that other structural changes affect our results, we decided to limit our 
post-regulation sample period to three years. Data on daily trading volume were 
collected from Stockdata nd the financial press (De Officiele Prijscourant and 
Het Financieele Dagblad). Eleven firms were dropped because stock price data 
was not available on the Datastream tape. 
In addition we collected data on annual earnings announcements. Announce- 
ment data for the years 1984 through 1989 were collected from the press releases 
of the Algemeen Nederlands Persbureau (ANP, the Dutch Press Agency) and Her 
Financieele Dagblad. Because we were unable to find announcements for a 
number of companies, our final sample contains 561 annual earnings announce- 
ments made by 114 firms. Most annual earnings reports are announced in March 
and April. 
3. Insider trading restrictions and liquidity 
'Liquidity' can potentially be proxied by three different variables: (1) trading 
volume; (2) the bid-ask spread, and (3) market depth, i.e., the extent o which 
trading volume generates significant price movements. The second measure is not 
relevant on the Amsterdam Stock Exchange: trading on the ASE occurs through 
matching buy and sell orders through a 'hoekman' (market maker) who acts like 
an auctioneer and, until July 1990, worked for a fixed commission. This commis- 
sion is set by the ASE and did not change through the sample period. The 
'hoekman' can trade f,~r his own account, but, in contrast to the NYSE specialist, 
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does not have to make a market. -~ Thas, the only relevant measures of liquidity 
are trading volume and market depth. 
3. !. The eff'ect of insider trading restriction on trading t'ohmle 
3. I.I. Methodology and hypotheses' 
Because the regulation restricted insider trading two months (or 40 trading 
days) betbre an annual earnings announcement we define the event period as the 
period starting 50 trading days prior to the earnings announcement (day - 50) and 
ending IO days after the announcement (day + 10). The IO extra days on both 
sides of the restricted trading period are added to test for potential shifts in trading 
hehaviour. Different ypes of traders may want to modify their trading behaviour. 
h~siders may want to liquidate their positions prior to the start of the restricted 
period, rather than be forced to hold the stock for another two months. Hence, as a 
result of the regulation, trading volume may increase prior to the restricted period. 
As the regulation will lorce them to delay their purchases, trading volume may 
also increase after the restricted period. However, as the Model Code is also 
intended to eliminate short-term insider trading (buying/selling before the earn- 
ings announcement and liquidating the position immediately afterwards), the effect 
on post-restriction trading volume is ambiguous. One prediction is clear: the 
regulation should reduce trading volume during the restricted period. 
LiquMio, traders, who in the past were reluctant to trade in the restricted pertod 
(because of the adverse selection problem) may now, after the introduction of the 
Model Code, no longer feel the need to (I) delay their trades after the earnings 
announcement or to (2) accelerate their trades prior to the restricted period. Hence, 
trading volume prior to and after the restricted period may fall, while trading 
volume during the restricted period will increase. 
Non-insider i~![brmation tradelw (as defined by Fishman and Hagerty (1992)) 
don't have to compete with insiders any more. Hence, the regulation may increase 
the number of short-term speculative traders, so that trading volume before and 
after the earnings announcement will increase. 
Noise trade~w trade on the basis of what they believe, falsely, is special 
intbrmation (Black, 1986, Delong et al., 1990). Similar to Cornell ar, d Sirri 
(1992). We lbcus on one type of noise trader who may be attracted to insider 
trading: falsely inforlned fundamental traders, i.e. investors who trade on funda- 
mentals, but do not have access to inside information. When prices move because 
of insider trading, such falsely int'ormed traders conc}ude that the movement is 
":' The trading hyslem on tile ASE during a ,~ampie period can be characterized as an order-driven 
.'~ystem. All orders, whether buy or sell, arrive through b~okers with the "hoekman', and are first 
matched, e,.ld then executed at t~ne singl:,' price. The pr,ce is fixed in such a way thai maximum number 
of buy and sell orders can he satisfied. No bid or ask price can he distinL:uished. 
R. Kabir. T. Vermaeh, n / European Frtmomw Re~'iew 40 (1996) 159i- 1603 1595 
unjustified and trade against it. If as a result of the Model Code stock prices move 
less because insiders are staying out of the market, trading volume will fall during 
the restricted period and possibly thereafter. 
Thus, depending on the relative importance of each trader type, trading w}lume 
may increase or decrease during the various .,,ubperiods. 
In order to compute abnormal volume, we assume that the normal trading 
volume is generated by the Market Model, which assumes that the expected 
volume has a company-specific component and a market component: 
E(In V,,) = a, + b, In E~,, ( I )  
where a~ and b~ are constants estimated using data in an estimation period and li,~, 
is the average trading volume of our portfolio of 114 securities on day t. The 
estimation period is defined as the 100 day period covering day - 100 until day 
-51  and day +11 until day +60. To make trading volume comparable over 
time, the number of shares traded on each day was divided by the number of 
shares outstanding on that day (see e.g. Beaver (1968) and Morse (1981) for a 
similar procedure). 3 Note that, by adjusting for the market, we are allowing for 
the fact that market conditions change across the sample period becau~ of 
structural events such as the 1987 Crash, volume changes in derivative markets 
etc. One drawback of the event study method here is that all companies in the 
index are affected by the event and events may be clustered as many firms 
announce their annual earnings in March or April. This will reduce the power of 
our test to detect any abnormal volume (positive or negative). However, it should 
be noted that (I) we are using daily data and (2) announcements are not 
concentrated on a specific day. Specifically, during our entire sample period we 
could not find a single day with more than five announcements. 
3.1.2. Results 
Table I shows the average daily abnormal trading volume around annual 
earnings announcements in each of the four subperiods: the pre-restricted period 
{P-5o.-4~), the 40-day reso'icted period (P-4o,-~), the two-day announcement 
period (Po.i) and the 9-day post-announcement period (P2.,~). Within the 40-day 
restricted period we examine three subperiods: P_ 3o.- i; P -  2o.- i; P -  io.- ~- 
Bc.th before and alter the introduction of insider trading regulation, trading 
volume increases ignificantly in the announcement period and in the post-an- 
nouncement period, a result also reported by others employing U.S. data (see e.g, 
Beaver, 1968; Morse, 198 ! ; Bamber, 1986). 
After the regulation trading volume fell significantly in the restricted period and 
in the three subperiods, and the decline ~.s most pronounced in the ten days 
Because of the requirement to have Ill0 trading days prior to the announcement (approximately 
live months) and because most earnings announcements are concentrated in March and April. data 
from 1984 are only used for estimation purposes. 
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Table I 
Average abnormal daily trading volume around annual earnings announcements i  specific sub-periods, a 
Period Pre-regulation Post regulation Post- Pre 
Pre-restricfed 
P-5o,-41 - 0.006 0.1)03 0.009 
(0.18) ( -O. lO) (0.22) 
Restricted 
P - 40.- i 0.038 0.006 - 0.044 
(2.35) " " ( - 0.42) ( - 2.04) " " 
P-3o.-. i 0.073 -0.011 -0.084 
(3.92) " * ( - 0.68) ( - 3.41) * * 
P-  2o.- t 0.097 0.027 - 0.070 
(4.26) * ' (I.34) ( - 2.33) * " 
P-  Io.- I 0.1~5 9057 -0.098 
(4.81) ~ " (2.02) ° * ( - 2.29) ' " 
Announcement 
/'o., 
Post-announcement 
P+2.1o 
0.656 0.693 0.036 
(9,08) * " (10.98) * ° (0.38) 
0.301 0.331 0.030 
(8.87) ° ° (I 1.39) * " (0.806) 
Sub-period PtJ.t2 covers the period from day tl until day t2, relative to the announcement date. 
Abnormal volume is computed using the Market Model (Eq. (I)) as a model of equilibrium trading 
volume. Trading volume is defined as the number of shares traded divided by the number of shares 
outstanding, t-statistics are in parentheses. The results are based on 561 annual earnings announce- 
ments made by 114 firms traded on the Amsterdam Stock Exchange between 1985 and 1989. The 
restricted period refers to the 40-day period during which insiders were not allowed to trade starting 
January 1987. The Post - Pre column computes the difference (and t-statistics) between trading volume 
behaviour before and after January 1987, the date when insider trading regulation was introduced. 
* * Value is significantly different from zero at the 5% significance l vel. 
* Value statistically significantly different from zero at the 10% significance l vel. 
preceding the announcement .  The  f inding that the trading vo lume in the restr icted 
period is affected, and not in the sur round ing periods, supports  the hypothes is  that 
the di f ference is a consequence  o f  the regulation. The  result that t rad ing ,  o lume 
falls s igni f icant ly dur ing the restr icted per iod is part icular ly strong, con,, idering 
that event-c luster ing reduces the power  o f  the test to f ind any s igni f icant  (posit ive 
or negat ive) abnormal  trading vo lume,  
There exists a lot o f  ev idence that (absolute)  stock returns and vo lume are 
posit ively correlated (see e.g. Karpoff ,  1986). Hence,  the abnormal  company-  
specif ic vo lume decl ine in the restricted period could s imply  reflect the fact that 
the company-spec i f i c  informat ion revealed dur ing the restr icted period (and the 
corresponding abnormal  returns) was  dif ferent after 1986 than before. For exam-  
ple, the restriction o f  the insiders to trade prior to earn ings  announcements  may 
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Table 2 
Average daily absolute abnormal return, before and after the introduction f insider regulation. ~ 
1597 
Period Pie-regulation Post regulation Post- Pie 
P-  4o, -  I 1.20 1.18 -0.02 
(-0.33) 
P-3o.- ~ 1.20 1.19 -0.01 
(-0.17) 
P-20.- i 1.21 1.2o o.01 
(-0.17) 
P- lo.- t 1.25 1.21 -0.04 
(-0.57) 
Subperiod Ptt.t2 covers the period from day tl until day t2, relative to the announcement dayof the 
annual earnings. Abnormal returns are computed employing the Market Model and are shown in 
percent, -statistics are shown in parentheses. 
lead to a change in the flow of other firm-specific information released by insiders. 
Insiders may try to time the release of information such that they are able to trade 
based on their private information prior to it becoming public. 
In order to test for this possibility, for each of the 561 earnings announcements 
absolute abnormal returns were computed in the 40 day restricted period. The 
abnormal returns should be good estimates of the company-specific information 
released uring the offer period. The M~ket Model was used to compute "normal' 
returns, employing data in the same 100-day estimation period as we used to 
estimate 'normal' volume. 
Table 2 shows the average daily absolute abnormal return in the 40-day 
restricted period and in the three subperiods, both before and after t~2e ,egulation. 
The table shows clearly that, for each subperiod, there is no significant difference 
in average absolute abnormal returns before 1987 and after 1986. Hence the 
volume decline reported in Table ! is not simply the result of a decline in flow of 
company-specific information. 
3.2. Insider trading restrictions and market depth 
In order to measure market depth we need to measure the extent to wl~,c~t 
trading volume affects prices, which in turn implies regressing trading volun:~ 
against price changes. For each of the 561 earnings announcements absolute 
returns were computed in the test period (i.e. day -50  through day + 10). Hence, 
we obtained a total of 34,221 observations which we then used in the following 
pooled regression: 
ABRETit = a + b Dummyit + c In(V~,) + d Dummyit(ln( I/it) ) +eit ,  (2) 
where V, is the trading volume of security i ( i=  1 . . . . .  561) on day t (t = 
- 50 . . . . .  + 10) which is defined as ratio of the number of shares traded on day t 
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divided by the number of shares outstanding on that day; ABRET~, is the absolute 
value of the return of security i on day t; Dummyi, = i if the observation is drawn 
from the post-1986 40-day restricted period and zero otherwise. The first dummy 
in the regression allows for a potential shift in the intercept o allow ibr a 
reduction in the fixed costs of trading. (see Cornell and Sirri, 1992). If insider 
trading restrictions increased market depth the value of b and/or d should be 
negative. 
The regression g'.-:ve the tbllowing results: a---0.03! ( t=  71), b =-0 .001  
(1=-1 .69)  c=0.00254 ( t=42)  and d= -0.001 ( t=-1 .53)  with an R-" of 
8%. 
Hence, while trad;..:d volume and absolute returns are positively correlated (a 
result also reported by Karpoff (1986)) we are unable to document any significant 
increase in market depth after 1986. This result is consistent with Cornell and Sirri 
(1992) who also reject the conventional hypothesis and argue that insiders 
indirectly increase market depth by encouraging noise traders to trade. 
4. The effect of insider trading restrictions on stock price behaviour 
it" markets become less efficient because of a reduction in insider trading 
activities, one would expect less stock market anticipation of earnings releases 
after 1986. in order to test this hypothesis, we develop a method that, unlike the 
classic method used by Ball and Brown (1968), does not depend on the specifica- 
tion of an earnings expectation model. 
4. I. Methodology 
First, individual stocks were ranked on the basis of cumulative xcess returns 
from day -40  to day + I, where excess returns are computed as before. The 
sample was divided into stocks with positive cumulative excess returns and 
negative cumulative xcess returns. While this method guarantees a large 'infor- 
mation content' of earnings announcements, it also implicitly assumes that cumu- 
lative excess returns 40 days prior to earnings announcements are uniquely caused 
by the earnings news. For our purposes, it is sufficient to assume that the 
distribution of non-earnings related company-specific news is uniformly dis- 
tributed across the sample period. 
Next, in order to test the speed of adjustment in a period starting T days before 
a specific earnings announcement i, (day -T )  until the announcement day (day 
0), we compute the weighted average anticipation time (WAAT) for each an- 
nouncenlen! i, as 
WAAT~ = ~ (3) 
CAR ,.r 
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where CARrr is the cumulative ',~cess return from day -T  until day 0 and e ,  is 
the abnormal return on day t. 4 In order to minimise the influence of outliers 
(resulting from dividing by very small numbers) all observations where the 
absolute value of the CARi r  is smaller than 3% were deleted. 
The WAAT corresponds to a duration measure that standardi~s for the 
information content of the earnings announcements. To see this, assume that the 
earnings announcement is the only company specific information released uring 
the 40-day pre-announcement period and announcement day. Hence, in a typical 
41 day period, there are 114 information arrivals (one earnings announcement for 
each of the 114 companies in the sample). Assume further that the insiders are the 
ones that receive the information first. If insiders are allowed to act on the 
information they will change prices, directly through their own trades, or indirectly 
by encouraging others to trade through information 'leakages', so that they make 
markets more efficient. This implies that. if insiders are allowed to trade, a larger 
fraction of the CAR will be observed early (when t in Eq. (3) is large). This will 
increase the WAAT for company i. However. by dividing by the CAR, we ensure 
that an increase in the information content of an earnings report will not 
necessarily increase the WAAT. 
4.2. Results  
Table 3 shows the results for various subperiods in the restricted period. The 
table compares the mean WAAT pre-regulation and post-regulation. Statistical 
tests are based on a non-parametric Mann-Whitney rank-sum test. 
Results are reported separately for all observations that experienced positive 
cumulative abnormal retut,'ns prior to the earnings announcement (Panel A) and 
negative cumulative abnormal returns (Panel B), for two reasons. First, as selling 
short is more costly especially for private investors, we would expect insider 
trading to occur less prior to bad news than prior to good news. Second, an insider 
who buys shares prior to the release of good news faces a trade-off. On the one 
hand, he would like to keep the good information secret in order to accumulate 
shares without affecting the market price. On the other hand, he would like to 
minimise his trading risk (related to non-company specific market information) 
and release the information as quickly as possible (e.g. through rumours). An 
insider with bad information (and who cannot sell short) does not face such a 
trade-off. As the only way to 'benefit' from negative information is to sell his 
shares (and e.g. invest the proceeds in a riskless asset), the insider always has an 
incentive to delay the release of bad information. 
" Because it is not clear when exactly the news becomes publicly available, we have computed tb~ 
"announcement day returns" as the stun of the return ~m day 0 and day + I. 
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Table 3 
Mean and standard eviation (in parentheses, below) of the weighted! average anticipation time 
(WAAT) of earnings announcements in the restricted period for various ub periods, before and after 
restrictions on insider trading. ~ 
Subperiod Pre-regulation n b Post regulation n t, Post - Pre p ¢ 
A. Good news sample 
P - 4 o.o 18.57 90 17.01 124 - 1.56 0. I 0 
(25.09) (18.03) 
P-3o,o 13.05 84 10.97 113 -2.08 0.35 
(I 1.73) (13.69) 
P-2t).o 9.89 27 7.66 104 -2.23 I).22 
(13.12) (9.23) 
P-  Io,~) 2.97 74 3.76 96 0.79 0.15 
(5.69) (4.40) 
B. Bad news sample 
P-4,~.o 16.81 78 18.21 135 1.40 0.32 
(19.65) (17.18) 
P-  ~l~,o 9.46 65 13.57 120 4. I I 0.01 
(12.51) (15.47) 
P- .~o.o 6.32 73 7.52 104 1.20 0.12 
(9.58) (13.44) 
P-  1o.~ 2.67 58 3.21 47 0.54 0.40 
(4.71) (3.69) 
a The table shows the mean and standard eviation of the weighted average anticipation time, for 
companies that prior to earnings anno~,ncements experienced positive : .ess returns (Panel A) and fo, 
companies that experienced negative xcess returns (Panel B) on the Amsterdam Stock Exchange 
between 1985 and 1989. The weighted average anticipation time for a specific earnings announcement 
i and time period T is computed by ibrmula (2) in the main body of the paper, where eit is the 
abnormal return (using the Malket Model) observed t days before the earnings announcement i, and 
the CARIT is the cumulative excess return from - T until day 0. Because all observations where the 
absolute value of CARrr is le:,s than 3% were deleted, the number of observations varies. The measure 
is computed lbr various subperiods: Subperiod P,i.t2 covers the period from day tl until day t2, 
relative to the announcement da e. P-values are based on the non-parametric Mann-Whitney rank sum 
est. 
Number of observations. 
¢ p = value using the Mann-Whitney test. 
Interest ingly,  cons istent  with these strategic ons iderat ions Table 3 shows  that, 
when insider trading was allowed, the mean WAAT was a lways  lower (in 
corresponding subper iods)  prior to bad news than prior to good news.  For 
example ,  in the subper iods P-30,o and P_  2o,u the mean WAAT is more than 40% 
shorter prior to bad news  than prior to good news (which is statistical ly s igni f icant 
at the 10% level). After  the introduct ion o f  insider trading regulat ion, the mean 
WAAT fal ls prior to good news  (except in the subper iod 10 days  prior to the 
ean: ings  announcement )  and rises prior to the release o f  bad news,  so that now the 
mean WAAT is no longer  s igni f icant ly smal ler  tbr bad news  than for good news.  
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For the good news sample, the results are consistent with the general view that 
'insider trading makes markets efficient'. In the 40 day restricted period, the mean 
WAAT falls by 1.56 days (or 8%), which is statistically significant at the 10% 
level on the basis of the Mann-Whitney test. Note that none of the other results in 
Panel A are statistically significant at the 10% level or less. The variability of the 
WAAT 5 makes economically significant declines in the mean WAAT (such as 
the 22% decline in period P-,_o.o) statistically insignificant at the 10% level or 
less. For the bad news sample, we observe (economically and statistically at the 
12% level or less) significant increases in the mean WAAT in period P-3n.o and 
period P-:o.0. This is consistent with the joint hypothesis that ( I)  short selling is 
costly and (2) insiders had incentive~ to delay the disclosure of bad news prior to 
1987. 
5. Summary 
The first major finding of this paper is that after the introduction of restrictions 
on insider trading, trading volume fell before earnings announcements, while the 
amount of company-specific information (as measured by the value of absolute 
excess returns) did not change. At the same time, market depth (i.e. the extent o 
which trading volume generates significant price movements) was not significantly 
affected by the regulation. The fact that the volume decline is only observed in the 
restricted trading period and not in the surrounding periods trongly supports the 
hypothesis that the difference is a consequence of the regulation. Second, after the 
introduction of restrictions on insider trading, the market anticipated good news 
later, but bad news earlier so that, on average, the market's peed of adjustment to 
annual earnings announcements was not significantly affected. 
Hence, the Model Code was an example of 'regulatory overkill' in the sense 
that it did not increase market liquidity. The argument that eliminating insiders 
will increase liquidity (something in which the ASE has a vested interest), ignt-,res 
the liquidity enhancing role of insiders themselves. Besides the direct impact of 
the elimination of their own trades, restriction of insider trading may have 
discouraged some noise traders (as argued by Cornell and Sirri (1992)). 
The finding that the reduct;on of insider trading increased the speed of 
adjustment to bad information may ,'effect he costs of selling short. Insiders have 
an incentive to delay the release of bad information: they do not have any 
incentive to unwind a speculative position early, while at the same time they prefer 
5 Eliminating all observations with c,.'mulative abnormal returns less than 3% does not eliminate all 
outliers. For example, a stock with a positive CAR could bave a very negative WAAT, if the stock 
experienced negative excess returns at the beginning of the test period but rebounded close to the 
announcement da e. 
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to unload all their holdings at the highest possible stock price. The f inding that 
after 1986 the market became less informational ly eff icient with respect to the 
release o f  good news is consistent with the traditional argument hat ' insiders 
make markets more eff ic ient' .  This result is also c,en~;istent with the f indings on 
U.S. markets by Corneli  and Sirri (1992) and Meulbroek 11992) 
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